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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Sentencing Commission ("Sentencing
Commission") drafted Rule 3E1.1 with an inherent ambiguity, one
that concerns both the Rule's purpose and design. Rule 3E1.1 al-
lows for a reduction in sentence if a criminal "accepts responsibil-
205
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ity" for his offense.' As result of the Rule's ambiguous language,
prior tensions in interpretation of its meaning have spilled over into
the current debate over sentence reductions.
The inherent ambiguity results from the Rule's genesis. The
Sentencing Commission enacted the Rule with the purpose of in-
creasing predictability in sentencing by reducing judicial
discretion.2 Before the enactment of the Rule, mitigating and ag-
gravating circumstances allowed for a great degree of judicial dis-
cretion, and it was this lack of uniformity that the Sentencing
Commission sought to lessen.3
Rule 3E1.1 also sought to ease the burden on the over-taxed
criminal justice system by encouraging guilty pleas.4 The Sentenc-
ing Commission initially feared, however, that granting an auto-
matic reduction in sentence for pleading guilty would run afoul of
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.5 Thus, their solution
was not to encourage criminal defendants to forgo their Sixth
Amendment right to trial and plead guilty, but rather to reward
them for general cooperation and contrition. By creating a system
in which criminal defendants were merely denied a reduction for
failing to cooperate with authorities, the Sentencing Commission
sought to encourage criminal defendants to plead guilty, while at
the same time avoiding the problem of unconstitutional conditions. 6
The resulting Rule achieved both goals. It encouraged guilty
pleas by reducing a defendant's sentence if he "accepted responsi-
bility" for his criminal conduct. 7 It also increased predictability by
1. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(a) (1998).
2. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (1994) (discussing the establishment and purposes of the United
States Sentencing Commission). Congress established the Sentencing Commission, in part, to
"provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted
sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of
similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sen-
tences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in the estab.
lishment of general sentencing practices." § 991(b)(1)(B).
3. See id. § 991(b)(1)(B).
4. See Michael M. O'Hear, Remorse, Cooperation, and "Acceptance of Responsibility". The
Structure, Implementation, and Reform of Section 3E1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91
Nw. U. L. Rev. 1507, 1513 (1997); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1, Appli-
cation Note 2. CThis adjustment is not intended to apply to a defendant who puts the govern-
ment to its burden of proof at trial by denying the essential factual elements of guilt, is con-
victed, and only then admits guilt and expresses remorse.").
5. See O'Hear, supra note 4, at 1513. The doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions" holds
"that the government 'may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitu-
tionally protected [liberties].' " Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996)
(quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)).
6. See O'Hear, supra note 4, at 1513.
7. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3El.l(a).
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creating an objective list of criteria that district courts would use to
determine whether a defendant had in fact "accepted responsibility"
for his crime. 8
The beauty of Rule 3E1.1 is that it has the added benefit of
stressing, and perhaps even expediting, the rehabilitation of crimi-
nals. It rewards those criminals who undertake such socially re-
deeming measures as making post-arrest rehabilitative efforts,9
cooperating with the police, and compensating victims of crime.10
Those who fail to demonstrate the acceptable levels of contrition are
not punished for their lack of remorse; rather, they simply do not
receive the reduction."
With the Rule's initial inclusion in the United States Sen-
tencing Guidelines ("Sentencing Guidelines") came a fundamental
question regarding its very purpose: Did Rule 3E1.1 seek to reward
a criminal for accepting responsibility for his specific crime, or did
it instead look to reward a criminal for accepting responsibility for
his criminal ways in general? Indeed, the circuits were divided as to
whether a defendant could earn the reduction only by admitting to
every criminal wrongdoing of which he was aware, or whether the
Rule allowed the reduction if he simply admitted only to the offense
for which he was charged.'
2
Faced with the split, the Sentencing Commission sought to
clarify Rule 3E1.1 in a 1992 amendment that changed the wording
of the Rule.13 The Sentencing Commission altered the Rule to re-
quire that a criminal only accept responsibility for his charged of-
fense, as opposed to his general acts of criminal conduct.14 As a re-
8. Id. For a list of these factors, see infra text accompanying note 37.
9. The Guidelines themselves recognize drug treatment and counseling as the two forms of
rehabilitative efforts that satisfy Rule 3ELl. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
3E1.1, Application Note 1(g). The effort must be proactive in some way;, merely 'staying out of
trouble" after an offense does not satisfy this requirement. See Lettieri v. United States. No. 96 C
4370, 1999 WNL 116205, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 1999) ("Ve do not believe, however, that staying
out of trouble in prison is the kind of rehabilitative effort that indicates acceptance of responsi-
bility within the meaning of the sentencing guidelines.").
10. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES §3El.1, Application Note 1(g).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 895 F.2d 932, 936-37 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that a
defendant is not penalized for failing to accept responsibility, since the reduction may be consid-
ered as a mitigating factor).
12. Compare Ud. at 936 (holding that a defendant may only earn the reduction by accepting
responsibility for all his criminal conduct), with United States v. Oliveras, 905 F.2d 623, 625 (2d
Cir. 1990) (holding that a defendant need only accept responsibility for those crimes with which
he is charged in order to earn the reduction).
13. UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES, ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSIBIITY WORMNG
GROUP 1 (1998).
14. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3El.l(a).
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sult, this change implied that a criminal need not admit to all his
crimes in order to receive the reduction.15
Despite the Sentencing Commission's attempt at clarifica-
tion, the controversy surrounding the meaning of Rule 3E1.1 re-
mains today, if in different form. Indeed, the new debate centers
around the Application Notes following the Rule. One of the objec-
tive indicia of acceptance of responsibility is a criminal defendant's
"voluntary termination or withdrawal from criminal conduct or as-
sociations."'16 This factor focuses on whether a criminal defendant
commits a crime between the time of his conviction or guilty plea
and the time of his sentencing. Mirroring the previous debate, the
current question centers around whether this Rule applies to all
crimes committed by the defendant after conviction and before sen-
tencing, or simply to those crimes that are related to the offense
with which the defendant has been charged. 1
7
The majority of circuits have held that any crime that takes
place between plea and sentencing may be used in the acceptance-
of-responsibility calculation. 18 Conversely, the Sixth Circuit alone
has held that "voluntary termination or withdrawal from criminal
conduct" means that only those crimes which are "related to the
underlying offense" may be used to determine acceptance of respon-
sibility.19
This Note seeks to demonstrate that the Sixth Circuit's ap-
proach is correct, and that only those crimes reasonably related to
an individuals underlying offense should be used in determining a
defendant's acceptance of responsibility under Rule 3El.1. The
Sixth Circuit based its decision on the premise that acceptance of
responsibility is inherently discrete. Under the Rule, criminals
must accept responsibility only for those crimes with which they are
presently charged, and not for additional crimes, future crimes, or
for their criminal dispositions in general.20 Moreover, since these
defendants are not accepting responsibility for future or unrelated
15. See United States v. Pace, 17 F.3d 341, 344 (11th Cir. 1994) C'[T]he change in [Rule]
3El.l(a) . . . was made to ensure that the district court did not deny a defendant a decrease
solely because the defendant did not voluntarily admit to all criminal conduct.").
16. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1, Application Note 1(b).
17. See United States v. Ceccarani, 98 F.3d 126, 129 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting the Sixth Cir-
cuit's holding that acceptance of responsibility considers only conduct related to the charged
offense, while other circuits have held that any crime may be considered).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 58-63.
19. United States v. Morrison, 983 F.2d 730, 735 (6th Cir. 1993).
20. See id.
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crimes, only a repetition of the same crime would demonstrate a
failure to accept responsibility and thereby negate the reduction.
This Note first shows that the concept followed by the Sixth
Circuit is clearly implied in the Sentencing Guidelines themselves.
Prior to the 1992 amendment of Rule 3E1.1, the circuits were di-
vided as to a whether a criminal must accept responsibility for any
crime of which he was aware, or only for the specific crime for
which he was charged.21 The wording of Rule 3E1.1 was amended in
1992 to settle the question-criminals need only accept responsi-
bility for the crime for which they are charged, and not for any
other criminal activity in which they are involved. 22 This amend-
ment reflects the view that when a defendant accepts responsibility
for his criminal conduct, he is owning up only to the instant crime
with which he is charged. As a result, only the criminal's repetition
of the same underlying crime should indicate a failure to accept re-
sponsibility.
This Note then examines the underlying policies behind Rule
3El.1. The Rule itself contains several explicit limitations that but-
tress the logic of the Sixth Circuit. The Application Notes following
the Rule limit the scope of what a judge may consider in the accep-
tance of responsibility determination. These Application Notes all
focus on post-arrest conduct that is, in some manner, reasonably
related to the underlying offense. 23 Furthermore, the Application
Notes following Rule 3E1.1 also reward (and therefore promote)
both contrition and cooperation on the part of the criminal defen-
dant.24 The approach of the Sixth Circuit is consistent with those
policies, and this consistency may ultimately advance the Rule's
goals.
This Note concludes with the argument that the approach of
the Sixth Circuit is more consistent with the overall purpose and
aim of the Sentencing Guidelines. The Sentencing Guidelines were
created in an effort to reduce disparities in judicial sentencing prac-
tices and to treat similarly situated criminals alike.25 This Note ar-
gues that the Sixth Circuit's approach promotes greater predict-
ability in sentencing. With a clear standard detailing what subse-
quent behavior may be used in the acceptance of responsibility de-
21. See infra text accompanying notes 76-82.
22. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E.1, Application Note 1(a) (1998).
23. See id.
24. See O'Hear, supra note 4, at 1512.
25. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1994) (stating that the purpose of the Guidelines is to avoid
unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found
guilty of similar criminal conduct).
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termination, sentencing judges will be more inclined to treat like
criminals alike. As such, the Sixth Circuit approach may also re-
duce instances of abuse of judicial discretion. Criminals who plead
guilty in reliance on a reduction will be less likely to lose that re-
duction for committing minor or petty crimes. In essence, this Note
concludes that the approach of the Sixth Circuit adds vital consis-
tency and predictability to sentencing determinations.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Structure of the Guidelines
Sentencing for crimes in federal jurisdictions is carried out
pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines.2 6 The Sentencing Guide-
lines were designed to serve as a rational, objective structure that
would eliminate much disparity in sentencing while still leaving
room for judicial discretion in select circumstances. 27
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, sentences are determined
according to a point system. 28 Points are calculated through the use
of a sentencing table-a grid containing 258 boxes. 29 On the hori-
zontal axis is the "Criminal History Category," which adjusts the
severity of the sentence based on the offender's past conviction rec-
ord.30 The vertical axis is labeled the "Offense Level," and it "re-
flects a base severity score for the crime committed, as further ad-
justed for those aspects of the crime, that the Guidelines deem rele-
vant to sentencing."3 ' In total, the grid contains forty-three offense
levels and six criminal history categories. 32 The potential sentence
is determined by the box at which the "Offense Level" axis and the
"Criminal History" axis intersect.
33
26. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(a). The creation of the Sentencing
Guidelines was authorized by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. See 28 U.S.C. § 991 (1994).
27. See Chantale LaCasse & A. Abigail Payne, Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Manda.
tory Minimum Sentences: Do Defendants Bargain in the Shadow of the Judge?, 42 J.L. & Econ.
245 (1999).
28. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, pt. A C'Introduction").
29. See James M. Anderson et al., Measuring Interjudge Sentencing Disparity, Before and
After the Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 271, 277 (1999).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, pt. A, § 4(h) (Introduction").
33. Anderson et al., supra note 29, at 278.
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Rule 3E1.1 is one of only a few ways in which a judge may
depart from the sentence arrived at in using the grid.34 Under Rule
3El.1, a judge may reduce a defendant's "score" based on a variety
of mitigating factors.35 The Rule allows for a reduction of two points
from the defendant's final score in the event that he accepts respon-
sibility for his criminal offense. 36 The Application Notes to the Rule
list eight factors that should be weighed by the sentencing judge in
order to determine whether a defendant has accepted responsibil-
ityY These factors include:
(a) truthfully admitting the conduct comprising the offense(s) of conviction, and
truthfully admitting or not falsely denying any additional relevant conduct for
which the defendant is accountable... ; (b) voluntary termination or withdrawal
from criminal conduct or associations; (c) voluntary payment of restitution prior to
adjudication of guilt; (d) voluntary surrender to authorities promptly after com-
mission of the offense; (e) voluntary assistance to authorities in the recovery of the
fruits and instrumentalities of the offense; (f) voluntary resignation from the office
or position held during the commission of the offense; (g) post-offense rehabilita-
tive efforts (e.g., counseling or drug treatment); and (h) the timeliness of the de-
fendanes conduct in manifesting the acceptance of responsibility.23
While the drafters of the Sentencing Guidelines viewed these
factors as "appropriate considerations," a judge is not necessarily
limited to the factors in his or her determination of acceptance of
responsibility.39 The Application Notes suggest that if a defendant
pleads guilty and takes "one or more of [these] actions... (or some
equivalent action)," he is then entitled to a reduction under the
Rule.40
B. The Split in Interpretation: The Meaning of Voluntary
Termination from Criminal Conduct
Section (b) of the Application Notes lists "voluntary termina-
tion or withdrawal from criminal conduct or associations" as a
means of earning the reduction.4' As such, the statutory meaning
34. Section 3 of the Sentencing Guidelines details adjustments to sentencing scores. Section
3A details victim related adjustments, section B provides for adjustments related to the defen-
danes role in the offense, section C details adjustments related to whether the defendant has
engaged in obstruction, and section D provides for adjustments when the defendant is convicted
of multiple counts of a crime. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, §§ 3A, 3B, 3C, 3D.
35. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3EB.I(a).
36. Id. Part (b) of Rule 3E1.1 also allows for an additional decrease of one level if the de-
fendant has qualified for a reduction under part (a) and has an offense level greater than sixteen.
Id. § 3El.l(b).
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accorded this section has been the source of division among the cir-
cuits. The minority view regarding the extent to which criminal ac-
tivity between plea and sentencing may be used to determine accep-
tance of responsibility appeared first in the case of United States v.
Morrison.42 The defendant in Morrison had previously been con-
victed of a felony, and was arrested for violating a federal handgun
law prohibiting felons from owning firearms. 4 In the time between
his guilty plea 44 and his sentencing, police again arrested the de-
fendant and charged him with attempted theft.45 Moreover, the de-
fendant also tested positive for drug use at this time. 46 During sen-
tencing for his federal handgun violation, the defendant sought a
reduction under Rule 3EI.. 4 7 The defendant claimed that he had
taken responsibility for his violation of the federal handgun law.
48
The district court denied the defendant's request on the grounds
that his criminal conduct between the time of his plea and the time
of his sentencing indicated that he had not accepted responsibility
for the federal handgun violation. 49
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit subsequently fo-
cused on the district court's denial of a reduction under Rule
3E1.1. 50 In doing so, the Court addressed the larger issue of
whether crimes unrelated to the original offense may properly be
considered in determining acceptance of responsibility.51 The court
held that "voluntary termination or withdrawal from criminal con-
duct' [referred only] to that conduct which [was] related to the un-
derlying offense." 52 The court interpreted the sentence to mean vol-
untary termination or withdrawal from that type of criminal con-
duct. The conduct could be the "same type as the underlying of-
fense, . . . the motivating force behind the underlying offense, re-
lated to actions toward government witnesses concerning the un-
derlying offense, . . . or otherwise [having a] strong link with the
42. United States v. Morrison, 983 F.2d 730 (6th Cir. 1993).
43. Id. at 731.
44. The defendant entered into a plea agreement with federal prosecutors. Id.
45. Id. at 733.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 731.
48. Id. The defendant asserted in his appeal that "he was candid about his actions, was Co.
operative with authorities, and pleaded guilty." Id. at 733.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 733-34.
52. Id. at 735 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1, Application Note
1(a) (1998)).
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underlying offense."53 Hence, criminal conduct unrelated to the
original offense may not be used to determine whether the defen-
dant has accepted-responsibility for his crime.51
The underlying foundation of the Morrison court's logic was
that Rule 3E1.1 only requires that a criminal accept responsibility
for the specific crime with which he is charged, and not for his
"criminal disposition" or for his illegal conduct in general.55 The
court was persuaded by the rationale that "an individual may be
truly repentant for one crime yet commit other unrelated crimes."56
The court's requirement that the additional offense be related to
the underlying crime allows for a case-by-case analysis of the de-
fendant's contrition, while also precluding generalizations in de-
termining the reduction.57 To count any criminal activity in the ac-
ceptance of responsibility calculation would force sweeping judg-
ments as to the defendant's actual contrition as well as to his
criminal predilection. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit felt that "either the
defendant is no longer of a criminal disposition, or he still is."58
In his separate opinion, Judge Kennedy concluded that the
broad language of Rule 3E1.1 made no specific reference to any re-
quirement that the crime be related to the underlying offense.59
Kennedy felt that the district court should have sole discretion in
determining whether a crime committed between plea and sen-
tencing illustrates a failure to accept responsibility for the under-
lying offense. 60
Other circuits have disagreed with the Morrison approach.
In United States v. McDonald, the Seventh Circuit held that any
criminal activity that occurs between plea and sentencing is evi-
53. Id.
54. See id. The Sixth Circuit recently held that failing to appear at the sentencing pro-
ceedings and resisting arrest are both reasonably related to an underlying offense of federal drug
violations. United States v. Scott, No. 98-5792, 1999 WL 701899, at *3 (6th Cir. Sept. 2, 1999)
(unpublished table decision).
55. See Morrison, 983 F.2d at 735.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 734.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 736 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) C'[Rule 3El.1] does
not include the word 'related' before the phrase 'criminal conduct,' which could quite easily have
been done had that been the Sentencing Commission's intent. Instead, the clear import of the
language is to include all criminal conduct and associations.").
60. Id. CThis is not to say a murderer caught stealing gum cannot receive the acceptance of
responsibility reduction. It is simply to state that a district court might or might not find the
theft of chewing gum in particular circumstances illuminative of whether the murderer has
accepted responsibility for her actions. I believe such a determination should rest with the dis-
trict court.").
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dence of defendant's failure to accept responsibility for his crime.61
Likewise, the Third Circuit in United States v. Ceccarani,62 the
Fourth Circuit in United States v. Farley,63 the First Circuit in
United States v. O'Neil,6 4 the Eleventh Circuit in United States v.
Pace,65 and the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Watkins66 all held
that any criminal activity between plea and sentencing may be used
in determining acceptance of responsibility. Each court reasoned
that the broad language of Rule 3E1.1 makes no specific reference
to any requirement that subsequent crimes be reasonably related to
the underlying offense. 67 Hence, under the majority view, any crime
committed between plea and sentencing may be used in the accep-
tance of responsibility calculation.
68
The Sixth Circuit has repeatedly affirmed its view from Mor-
rison that "voluntary . . . withdrawal from criminal conduct" re-
quires that any subsequent crime be reasonably related to the un-
derlying offense. 69 For instance, the court has held that repeated
drug use while awaiting sentencing for a drug conviction and re-
peated assault while awaiting sentencing for an assault conviction
are both reasonably related to their underlying crimes, thus pre-
cluding the defendant from earning the Rule 3E1. 1 reduction. 70
61. United States v. McDonald, 22 F.3d 139, 144 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that the defen.
dants use of marijuana while awaiting trial indicated that he had not accepted responsibility for
his crime of aiding and abetting counterfeiting).
62. United States v. Ceccarani, 98 F.3d 126, 130 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that defendant's
drug use indicated failure to accept responsibility for his crime of unlawful possession and dis-
posal of a firearm).
63. United States v. Farley, No. 94-5624, 1995 WL 298096, at *1 (4th Cir. May 17, 1995)
(unpublished table decision) (holding that defendant's drug use indicated failure to accept re-
sponsibility for his crime of conspiracy).
64. United States v. O'Neil, 936 F.2d 599, 600 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that a defendant's
subsequent drug use indicated a failure to accept responsibility for his crime of mail fraud).
65. United States v. Pace, 17 F.3d 341 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that defendant's subsequent
drug use indicated failure to accept responsibility for his crime of conspiracy to commit fraud).
66. United States v. Watkins, 911 F.2d 983, 985 (5th Cir. 1990) (determining that defen.
danes subsequent drug use indicated a failure to accept responsibility for his crime of passing
forged treasury checks).
67. See, e.g., Ceccarani, 98 F.3d at 130 (holding that the language of Rule 3E1.1 is general
and does not specify that the appropriate considerations include only conduct related to the un-
derlying offense).
68. See Pace, 17 F.3d at 343 (noting that the "voluntary withdrawal from criminal conduce'
factor "is phrased in general terms and does not specify that the defendant need only refrain
from criminal conduct associated with the offense of conviction in order to qualify for the reduc-
tion").
69. For the original proposition, see Morrison, 983 F.2d at 735.
70. See United States v. Askew, No. 97-6278, 1999 WL 236187, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 14, 1999)
(unpublished table decision) (holding that use of cocaine while awaiting sentencing was reasona-
bly related to the underlying crime of cocaine possession); United States v. Smith, No. 94.6113,
214
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The Sixth Circuit has, however, broadened its definition of
what crimes are "reasonably related" to the underlying offense. In
United States v. Bordayo, the court held that the defendant's com-
mission of several alcohol related crimes while awaiting sentencing
was reasonably related to the underlying offense of conspiracy to
import marijuana. 71 The court justified its result by noting that
Morrison divided crimes committed while awaiting sentencing into
two categories: those which are "wholly distinct" from the underly-
ing offense, and those which are not.72 Thus, because the court
found that the alcohol-related crimes were not "wholly distinct"
from the drug-related conviction, it held that the defendant had not
voluntarily withdrawn himself from criminal conduct.73 Despite this
broadening notion of "reasonably related" crimes, however, the
Sixth Circuit has given no indication that it will formally change its
interpretation of Rule 3E1.1 as delineated in Morrison.74
III. SPECIFIC CRIME VS. CRIMINAL WAYS IN RULE 3E1.1
At first glance, it appears that the Sixth Circuit's decision in
Morrison is a curious one. As the majority of circuits have pointed
out, the language in Application Note 1(b) following Rule 3E1.1
clearly states that "voluntary withdrawal from criminal conduct or
associations" is a relevant factor in determining whether a defen-
dant has accepted responsibility.75 There is no indication within the
plain meaning of the text that only those crimes that are reasona-
bly related to the underlying offense may be considered by the
court.
76
Despite this clear language to the contrary, the Sixth Circuit
gave only a cursory explanation of its conclusion in Morrison. The
court briefly states, "[w]e hold that acceptance of responsibility, as
1996 WL 20501, at *1-2 (6th Cir. Jan. 18, 1996) (unpublished table decision) (holding that defen-
dants assault on a roommate while awaiting sentencing was reasonably related to the underly-
ing crime of assaulting a national park ranger). Both of these cases illustrate the Sixth Circuits
focus on the secondary crimes themselves and not on the extrinsic details surrounding the
crimes.
71. United States v. Bordayo, No. 93-1654, 1994 VL 198187, at *2 (6th Cir. May 19, 1994).
72. Id.
73. See id.
74. See, e.g., id.
75. See, e.g., United States v. Ceccarani, 98 F.3d 126, 129 (3d Cir. 1996) C Application] note
1(b) is phrased in general terms and should be interpreted to include criminal conduct committed
since the underlying offense, even of a different character.").
76. See supra text accompanying note 38.
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contemplated by the United States Sentencing Commission, is 'ac-
ceptance of responsibility for his offense' . . . not for 'illegal conduct'
generally."77 By so holding, the Sixth Circuit adopted the idea that,
in order for a defendant to earn a reduction under Rule 3E1.1, he
need only accept responsibility for the specific crime with .which he
was charged.78 Under the Sixth Circuit's view, a reduction under
Rule 3E1.1 does not hinge on whether a criminal defendant accepts
responsibility for his criminal nature in general, but instead de-
pends on whether the defendant consciously and affirmatively ac-
cepts responsibility for the specific offense with which he is
charged.7 9 Only a repetition of this offense would indicate that the
defendant has not accepted responsibility for his crime.80
In spite of the court's cursory explanation of its methodology,
the means by which the Sixth Circuit arrived at this understanding
of Rule 3E1.1 were not through judicial fancy. Rather, the Sixth
Circuit's conclusion resulted from both the major split among the
circuits as to the core meaning of Rule 3E1.1 and the eventual
amendment to the Rule itself.
A. The Background for the Sixth Circuit's Decision
Prior to 1992, a split existed among the circuits as to the
fundamental meaning and requirements of Rule 3E1.1. Before its
amendment, the Rule had allowed a sentencing reduction "[i]f a de-
fendant clearly demonstrates a recognition and affirmative accep-
tance of personal responsibility for his criminal conduct."' The cir-
cuits were divided as to whether the Rule required a defendant to
accept responsibility for crimes other than those to which he had
plead guilty or been found guilty.8 2 In application, the courts ques-
tioned whether they were required to deny a defendant a reduction
if he refused to admit to any and all crimes with which he had not




81. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, app. C ("Amendments to the Sentencing
Guidelines Manual of October of 198T) (1998) (emphasis added).
82. Compare United States v. Oliveras, 905 F.2d 623, 629 (2d Cir. 1990) (interpreting Rule
3El.1 as applying to defendants who accept responsibility "for conduct included in those counts
to which he has pled guilty") with United States v. Gordon, 895 F.2d 932, 936 (4th Cir. 1990)
(holding that a defendant must accept responsibility for all his criminal conduct in order to earn
a reduction under 3E1.1).
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yet been charged.83 The First Circuit in United States v. Perez-
Franco,84 the Second Circuit in United States v. Oliveras,85 and the
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Piper86 all determined that the
acceptance of responsibility reduction of Rule 3E1.1 only required
individuals to accept responsibility for those crimes with which they
had been charged. These courts reasoned that criminals enjoy a
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in sentenc-
ing.8 7 To condition the receipt of a benefit (in this case, a reduction
in sentence) on the refusal to invoke one's Fifth Amendment privi-
leges violated the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.88 These
three circuits found that the scope of judicial inquiry in a Rule
3E1.1 reduction was necessarily limited to a determination of
whether the defendant had accepted responsibility for the instant
offense. The Piper court summed up the circuits' conclusion when it
held that "a defendant must show contrition for the crime of which
he was convicted, but he need not accept blame for all crimes of
which he may be accused."89
Other circuits disagreed. Both the Fourth Circuit in United
States v. Gordon and the Fifth Circuit in United States u. Mourning
viewed Rule 3E1.1 as requiring a criminal defendant to accept re-
sponsibility for all his criminal conduct, regardless of whether he
had been charged with the crime.9 0 The courts reasoned that deny-
ing a mitigating factor in sentencing was not the same as with-
holding a benefit and, therefore, such a denial did not violate the
83. See United States v. Perez-Franco, 873 F.2d 455, 459 (1st Cir. 1989) Cf a defendant's
'criminal conduct is interpreted to mean literally 'all of his criminal conduct,' then not only does
it include counts for which he wasrindicted and to which he has not pleaded guilty, but also must
include criminal activity relating to the current offense for which he may not have been indicted,
as well as any past criminal conduct. This reading could not possibly have been what the drafters
intended!').
84. See id.
85. Oliveras, 905 F.2d at 629.
86. United States v. Piper, 918 F.2d 839 (9th Cir. 1990).
87. See, e.g., Perez-Franco, 873 F.2d at 462 ("The [Fifth Amendment] privilege is not ordi-
narily dependent upon the nature of the proceeding in which the testimony is sought or is to be
used.") (quoting McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924)).
88. See id. at 463 (noting that withholding a benefit for invoking one's Fifth Amendment
right is identical to imposing a penalty for invoking the same right, an action invalidated by the
Supreme Court).
89. Piper, 918 F.2d at 841.
90. United States v. Mourning, 914 F.2d 699, 705 (5th Cir. 1990) ('We hold that, before a
defendant is entitled to a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, he must first accept respon-
sibility for all of his relevant criminal conduct."); United States v. Gordon, 895 F.2d 932, 936 (4th
Cir. 1990) ('Ve believe the approach taken by the Second and Fifth Circuits is correct and hold
that in order for [Rule] 3El.1 of the guidelines to apply, a defendant must first accept responsi-
bility for all of his criminal conduct." (emphasis added)).
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unconstitutional conditions doctrine.9' These courts believed that
for a criminal to earn a reduction under Rule 3E1.1, he must first
accept responsibility for any and every crime with which he was
associated.92
The Sentencing Commission was aware of the split among
the circuits.93 To find a solution, the Sentencing Commission cre-
ated a working group to study the split.94 As a result, the Accep-
tance of Responsibility Working Group addressed the problem and
proposed various solutions. 95 More specifically, the Working Group
suggested three possible solutions to the split: "(1) No change; (2)
[r]ewrite the guideline so that it explicitly requires a defendant to
accept responsibility for only the offense of conviction; and (3)
[r]ewrite the guideline so that it explicitly requires a defendant to
accept responsibility for the offense and all relevant conduct."96
The Commission's chosen result became the 1992 amend-
ment, which altered the guideline to allow a reduction "[i]f the de-
fendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his
offense."97 The Sentencing Commission changed Rule 3E1.1 so as to
explicitly exclude the concept that all criminal conduct should be
considered in the acceptance of responsibility calculus.98 In doing
so, the Sentencing Commission actively limited the entire scope of
Rule 3E1. 1 as well as the conduct it sought to reward.
B. The Instant Decision: The Morrison Court's Rationale
It was this fundamental change in the scope and nature of
Rule 3E1.1 that the Morrison court considered in formulating its
new interpretation of the "voluntary termination or withdrawal
from criminal conduct" factor. 99 Morrison was based on the concept
that when a criminal defendant accepts responsibility under Rule
3El. 1, it is only for the offense for which he has been found guilty,
91. E.g., Gordon, 895 F.2d at 936.
92. See, e.g., id. C'[I]n order for [Rule] 3E1.1 of the guidelines to apply, a defendant must
first accept responsibility for all of his criminal conduct.").
93. See ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY WORKING GROUP, UNITED STATES SENTENCING





97. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(a) (1998).
98. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 93.
99. See United States v. Morrison, 983 F.2d 730, 735 n.1 (6th Cir. 1993).
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and not for any tangential criminal conduct with which he was as-
sociated. 100 The amendment, in the view of the Morrison court, de-
liberately shifted the focus of the acceptance of responsibility de-
termination.101
With the change in wording from "criminal conduct" to "of-
fense," the Rule now focuses on whether a criminal demonstrates
true remorse for that specific crime with which he was charged, and
not whether the criminal demonstrates contrition for his criminal
disposition in general. 10 2 The Morrison court concluded that if Rule
3E1.1 required only that an individual accept responsibility for the
instant offense, he should not lose the reduction for failing to accept
responsibility for additional, unrelated crimes. 103
The extension of this concept to Application Note 1(b) is evi-
dent. The logic of the Morrison court was that the amendment of
Rule 3E1.1 was not simply a change in the Rule's wording, but
rather a radical shift in the Rule's focus and scope. As such, this
fundamental change should naturally apply to all elements of the
Rule, including the Application Notes.10 - Hence, the Morrison court
logically concluded that "voluntary termination or withdrawal from
criminal conduct or associations" should also apply only to the in-
stant offense. The court reasoned that since the defendant could
only be asked to demonstrate remorse for the crime with which he
was charged, only the commission of a similar crime would demon-
strate a true lack of remorse and a failure to accept
responsibility.0 5 In other words, since a criminal was only asked to
100. See id. at 735.
101. See id. ("We note that [Rule] 3El.l(a) was recently amended, effective November 1, 1992
.... While we do not necessarily interpret this amendment as a change from a 'criminal disposi-
tion' rationale to a 'case.by-case' rationale, we find that it helps clarify the issue in a manner that
supports our point of view).
102. See United States v. Bordayo, No. 93-1654, 1994 WL 198187, at *2 (6th Cir. May 19,
1994) (unpublished table decision) (noting that the Morrison holding was based on the concept
that Rule 3El.1 should reward "true remorse for specific criminal behavior').
103. Morrison, 983 F.2d at 735.
104. This is a logical assumption given the wording of the Application Notes. Of the eight
suggested indicia indicating acceptance of responsibility, four specifically refer to conduct sur-
rounding the instant "offense." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1, Application
Notes 1(a)-(h) (1998).
105. See Morrison, 983 F.2d at 735. The fundamental counter-argument espoused by the
majority of circuits centers around the significance of subsequent crimes and what they repre-
sent. The majority view is that even if a defendant may only be asked to accept responsibility for
his underlying offense, the commission of any crime demonstrates a fundamental lack of contri-
tion. E.g., United States v. Ceccarani, 98 F.3d 126, 130 (3d Cir. 1996) ("Continual criminal activ-
ity, even differing in nature from the convicted offense, is inconsistent with an acceptance of
responsibility and an interest in rehabilitation."). Essentially, if a defendant commits any crime,
he cannot be truly sorry for his underlying offense. This approach has two flaws. First, it tends to
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accept responsibility for crime X, then only a subsequent crime
which exhibited his failure to actually accept responsibility for
crime X should void the reduction. It is therefore possible, both psy-
chologically and statutorily, for a criminal defendant to be "truly
repentant for one crime yet commit other unrelated crimes. 106
C. Support Within the Rule: Other Elements of Rule 3E1.1 That
Point Towards the Morrison Approach
The Morrison court listed few reasons for their limitation of
"voluntary termination or withdrawal of criminal conduct," relying
mainly on the amendment of the Rule 3E1.1 for its justification.
10 7
Despite this lack of explicit justification, there are other factors
within Rule 3E1.1 that buttress the Morrison court's approach. In-
deed, the scope and wording of several of the Application Notes fol-
lowing the Rule lend support to the Morrison court's view that only
those subsequent crimes that are reasonably related to the under-
lying offense may be used in the acceptance of responsibility calcu-
lation. 1
08
Application Note 1(a) affirmatively limits the scope of judi-
cial inquiry in acceptance of responsibility determinations by stat-
ing, in part, that "a defendant is not required to volunteer, or af-
firmatively admit, relevant conduct beyond the offense of conviction
in order to obtain a reduction under subsection (a)." 109 The Note
proceeds by stating that "[a] defendant may remain silent in respect
to relevant conduct beyond the offense of conviction without affect-
ing his ability to obtain a reduction under this subsection." 110
This Application Note supports the logic of the Morrison
court. Indeed, the Note makes it clear that a defendant is only
asked to act consistently with accepting responsibility for the
charged offense. If a defendant is not required to accept responsi-
bility for anything other than the charged offense, then a random or
lead to greater judicial discretion and variation in sentencing, two elements seen as undesirablo
by the Sentencing Commission. See infra notes 137-144 and accompanying text. Under the ma-
jority view, one defendant could lose his reduction because of a speeding ticket, while a defen-
dant convicted of an identical underlying offense could retain his. Second, this approach miscon-
strues the fundamental nature of the acceptance of responsibility determination. Rule 3E1.1 is
not a general mitigating or aggravating determination, nor is it a parole revocation proceeding.
Rule 3E1.1 requires unique considerations wholly dissimilar to other types of proceedings.
106. See Morrison, 983 F.2d at 735.
107. See id.
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unrelated crime does not indicate a failure to accept responsibility.
Thus, only a crime similar to the underlying offense demonstrates a
failure to accept responsibility.
Note 1(a) goes on to define the scope of the conduct that a de-
fendant must accept in order to earn the reduction. More specifi-
cally, it requires that a defendant truthfully admit any conduct that
is relevant to his offense under Rule lB1.3 of the Sentencing
Guidelines."' Rule 1B1.3 defines relevant conduct as "all acts and
omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, in-
duced, procured, br willfully caused by the defendant.., that oc-
curred during the commission of the offense of conviction." 1 2 Thus,
the inclusion of Rule 1B1.3 in Application Note 1(a) is yet another
limitation on the scope of the acceptance of responsibility determi-
nation. The Morrison approach becomes logical, given the explicit
limitation found in Note 1(a). The defendant cannot be asked if he
has committed additional, unrelated crimes, and his reduction can-
not be lost if he has in fact committed unrelated crimes. Given this
explicit limitation, it is logical to assume that unrelated, post-
offense crimes cannot suddenly become cogent in the sentencing
determination of a discrete offense.
Other Application Notes also support the Morrison
approach." 3 These supportive Notes all focus on post-plea activity
that is somehow related to the underlying offense. For example, a
defendant can earn the reduction if he voluntarily pays restitution
to the victims of the crime, assists the authorities in recovering the
instrumentalities of the offense, or takes rehabilitative steps such
as counseling for his offense." 4 These factors all focus on actions
that are reasonably related to the underlying offense-actions that
demonstrate that a defendant is sorry for his specific crime. Defen-
dants are not asked to make general contributions to a victim resti-
tution fund, nor are they asked to turn in the instrumentalities of
other offenses. The scope of the Application Notes is limited to post-
arrest behavior based on the underlying offense.
The Application Notes demonstrate that Rule 3E1.1 is not
the federal equivalent to the mitigating or aggravating factor de-
termination in typical state sentencing. Instead, it is a narrowly
and carefully tailored calculation used to determine whether a de-
fendant cooperates with authorities and demonstrates appropriate
111. Id.
112. Id. § 1B1.3(a)(1).
113. See infra text accompanying notes 117-19.
114. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1, Application Notes.
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contrition for the crime with which he is charged. Hence, the Rule's
limited construction and focus bolster Morrison's more narrow in-
terpretation.
IV. UNDERLYING POLICIES IN RULE 3E1.1: THE MORRISON
APPROACH AS CONSISTENT WITH REQUIREMENTS OF
COOPERATION AND CONTRITION
Courts have recently begun to interpret Rule 3E1.1 as con-
taining two distinct elements." 5 One component of the Rule pro-
motes and rewards defendants who cooperate with law enforcement
and with the prosecution in arriving at an expedited guilty verdict.
The other component promotes and rewards defendants who dem-
onstrate to the court remorse and contrition for their actions.
Within the actual Rule itself, there is little indication of this
inherent tension between the two elements. The Rule simply reads,
"[i]f the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility
for his offense, decrease the offense level by 2 levels.""16 Within the
Application Notes, however, the tension becomes more apparent.
The Notes following the Rule list eight indicia that a court may use
in determining whether a defendant has accepted responsibility. i 7
These indicia are evenly divided into the two themes. Four of the
indicia reflect the focus on cooperation with authorities in securing
a guilty verdict: truthfully admitting the conduct comprising the
offense, voluntary surrender to authorities, voluntary assistance in
the recovery of the instrumentalities of the offense, and doing all
such acts in a timely manner."l 8 The other four reflect a focus on
genuine remorse and post-arrest good deeds: payment of restitution
to the victim, cessation of criminal conduct, resignation from any
office held during the commission of the offense, and post-offense
rehabilitative efforts such as counseling.1 9 Because it maintains
the primacy of the cooperation prong and also because its increased
predictability may actually encourage contrition, the Morrison
court's interpretation of "voluntary termination or withdrawal from
criminal conduct" is consistent with both themes of Rule 3E 1.1.
115. E.g., United States v. De Leon Ruiz, 47 F.3d 452, 455 (1st Cir. 1995) (noting the two
elements pervade Rule 3E1.1, "recogniz[ing] a defendanes sincere remorse and... reward[ing] a
defendant for saving the government from the trouble and expense of going to trial" (emphasis
added)).
116. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(a).
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While it may not have originally been the chief concern of
the Sentencing Commission, 120 the question of whether a defendant
has cooperated with authorities in securing a conviction has as-
sumed a degree of prominence in the acceptance of responsibility
calculation.' 12 Accordingly, a defendant who has consistently re-
fused to cooperate with authorities--either by contesting his guilt,
refusing to furnish the instrumentalities of the offense, or failing to
surrender in a timely manner-has little chance of earning the re-
duction. 122 Though the Notes clarify that a guilty plea is not abso-
lutely required for a reduction, they also stipulate that the "ad-
justment is not intended to apply to a defendant who puts the gov-
ernment to its burden of proof at trial by denying the essential fac-
tual elements of guilt."m  From a functional standpoint, therefore,
cooperation with authorities is the key foundation on which courts
base the reduction.
The Morrison approach is also consistent with the Rule's fo-
cus on cooperation with authorities. 4 Under the Morrison interpre-
tation, the primacy of the cooperation prong remains unchanged.
The question of whether a defendant has cooperated with the
authorities and facilitated a guilty plea remains a pivotal inquiry. A
defendant who has contested his guilt, refused to surrender himself
promptly to authorities, or declined to furnish the instrumentalities
of the offense will, under Morrison, still presumably fail to earn the
reduction.12S The court's limitation of "voluntary termination or
withdrawal from criminal conduct" to those crimes that are rea-
sonably related to the underlying offense does not alter what ap-
pears to be the primary mission of Rule 3E1.1: to speed and facili-
tate guilty pleas.
120. See O'Hear, supra note 4, at 1524-25.
121. See id.
122. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3El.I, Application Note 6 (noting that the
reduction is intended to apply to defendants who assist the authorities in the investigation or
prosecution of his own misconduct).
123. Id. § 3E1.1, Application Note 2.
124. It is important to note that the "cooperation" element applies only to a defendant's coop-
eration in and up to the securing of a guilty verdict. See id. There are no indications from the
Rule or the Application Notes that post-arrest cooperation is a relevant consideration. Post-
arrest behavior listed by the Application Notes tends to fall into the category of "remors.. See
supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
125. The Sixth Circuit has recently made this clear in a series of cases. See, eg., United
States v. Maxwell, No. 98-5815, 2000 WL 178387, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 8, 2000) (unpublished table
decision) (holding that a failure to appear at a hearing was sufficient lack of cooperation to jus-
tify a denial of reduction under Rule 3E1.1); United States v. Chapa, No. 98-6158, 1999 WL
1253088, at *4 (6th Cir. Dec. 17, 1999) (unpublished table decision) (holding that defendant's




The second prong of Rule 3E1.1 involves contrition. As evi-
denced by the Application Notes, a defendant can demonstrate ac-
ceptance of responsibility for his crime by showing a certain degree
of remorse. 126 This remorse takes the form of certain positive, so-
cially encouraged post-offense actions. 127 It "calls for an inquiry into
the defendant's state of mind and is thought to reward an appropri-
ate attitude."'128 Though not as fundamental an inquiry as coopera-
tion, 129 the contrition element nevertheless plays an important role
in the decisions of many courts.
80
The Morrison approach comports with the contrition prong of
Rule 3E1.1, albeit in a more limited way. The Morrison court for-
mulated its opinion around the premise that "an individual may be
truly repentant for one crime yet commit other unrelated crimes."'' 1
Under the Morrison standard, defendants are still required to show
contrition for their offense in order to earn a departure. 18 2 Morrison
simply limits the extent to which contrition functions as a factor. As
the majority of courts have stated, repeated criminal activity may
be regarded as an indication of a lack of overall, general
contrition. 133 The Morrison approach adopts a narrower, more spe-
cific view of the contrition prong. It reasonably assumes that if the
question to be put to a criminal defendant is whether he is sorry for
his underlying offense and no more, then subsequent inquiries must
be limited to acts related to that offense.
Furthermore, the Morrison standard, by increasing predict-
ability, may actually encourage cooperation, and, by doing so, better
126. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3El1.l, Application Notes.
127. These are "voluntary termination or withdrawal from criminal conduct or associations,"
"voluntary payment of restitution prior to adjudication of guilt," "voluntary resignation from the
office or position held during the commission of the offense," and "post-offense rehabilitative
efforts." Id. § 3E1.1, Application Notes 1(b), (c), (f), (g).
128. O'Hear, supra note 4, at 1511.
129. Several sections of the Commentary indicate that cooperation with authorities is fun-
damental to acceptance of responsibility. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
3E1.1, Application Note 1(a) ([A] defendant who falsely denies, or frivolously contests, relevant
conduct that the court determines to be true has acted in a manner inconsistent with acceptance
of responsibility."); Application Note 6 (noting that the reduction is intended to apply only to
defendants who assist the authorities in the investigation or prosecution of his own misconduct).
130. See, e.g., United States v. O'Neil, 936 F.2d 599, 600 (lst Cir. 1991) (holding that post.
arrest conduct could shed light on the sincerity of a defendant's remorse).
131. United States v. Morrison, 983 F.2d 735, 735 (6th Cir. 1993).
132. See, e.g., United States v. Rudolph, 190 F.3d 720, 726 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that reha-
bilitative efforts may be the basis of a reduction, but they must be sincere and exceptional ef-
forts); United States v. Van Shutters, 163 F.3d 331, 340-41 (6th Cir. 1998) (affirming a denial of
a Rule 3El.1. reduction because the defendant had consistently failed to demonstrate any re-
morse), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1077 (1999).
133. See, e.g., United States v. Ceccarani, 98 F.3d 126, 130 (3d Cir. 1996).
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serve the fundamental, underlying elements of the Rule. A major
focus of Rule 3E1.1 is to encourage criminals to plead guilty,
thereby saving federal prosecutors the time and expense of trials. 134
It is likely that more defendants may cooperate and plead guilty if
they are assured that they will not lose their reduction over a mi-
nor, unrelated offense. The Morrison approach ensures that only
those crimes that are reasonably related to the underlying offense
will be used in the determination, 3 5 while the majority approach
reserves the right to count (or discount) any subsequent crime. For
Rule 3E1.1 to function properly, it must treat like acts alike. Rule
3El. 1 must deliver its grant or reduction uniformly, since "an effec-
tive incentive structure must deliver its rewards in [a] clear ...
[and] predictable manner."13 6 The approach of the Sixth Circuit en-
courages greater cooperation from criminal defendants by increas-
ing the degree of predictability in the sentencing process.
V. UNIFORMITY AND PREDICTABILITY: THE MORRISON
APPROACH'S CONSISTENCY WITH THE OVERALL PURPOSE OF
THE GUIDELINES
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 primarily sought to cre-
ate a system of guidelines that provided "certainty and fairness in
meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sen-
tencing disparities among defendants with similar records who
have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct."'37 The Act en-
visioned some flexibility, though only enough to "permit individu-
alized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating fac-
tors."3 8 Yet despite this reference to flexibility, the legislative his-
tory surrounding the Act indicates that its core objective was to
create consistency and eliminate the incongruity resulting from ju-
dicial discretion in sentencing.13 9 The Sentencing Guidelines sought
to create a predictable system whereby an individual's crime, rather
than "the identity of the sentencing judge and the nature of his sen-
tencing philosophy," would determine his sentence. 40
134. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES %ANUAL § 3E1.1, Application Notes (1998) ('Chis
adjustment is not intended to apply to a defendant who puts the government to its burden of
proof at trial by denying the essential factual elements of guilt, is convicted, and only then ad-
mits guilt and expresses remorse.").
135. Morrison, 983 F.3d at 735.
136. O'Hear, supra note 4, at 1546.
137. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1994).
138. Id.
139. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 52 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CA.N. 3182, 3235.
140. Id. at 161, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3344.
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The Morrison approach comports with the Sentencing
Guidelines' focus on predictability, and it also avoids the disparities
inherent in the majority approach. Under Morrison, a court may
only consider those crimes (committed between plea or conviction
and sentencing) that are reasonably related to the underlying of-
fense in the acceptance of responsibility determination. 4 1 Thus, the
commission of a dissimilar crime in between plea and sentencing
could not be used to determine that the defendant had failed to ac-
cept responsibility for his previous crime. 142 Under the majority ap-
proach, judges have sole discretion to decide whether the commis-
sion of a crime indicates a failure to accept responsibility for a past
crime. 43 This indicates that, in some instances, a judge may find
that continued criminal activity does not preclude an individual
from receiving a reduction for acceptance of responsibility.14 In
other instances, however, a judge may hold that any crime, regard-
less of how minor, may result in a loss of the acceptance of respon-
sibility reduction. 145 This increase in judicial discretion thus limits
the uniformity in sentencing that the Sentencing Guidelines sought
to implement.
The Morrison approach reduces this fundamental disparity
in judicial sentencing. By creating a definitive standard for deter-
mining what crimes may be considered when deciding whether to
grant a reduction, the court limits the possible. range of reductions
that could be handed down by the court. The Morrison standard
increases the probability that similar criminals will receive consis-
tent, predictable sentences for committing the same crime, while it
decreases the probability that a criminal will be subject to unrea-
sonable sentence stringency based on "the identity of the sentencing
judge and the nature of his sentencing philosophy."14 6
More specifically, the Morrison approach limits the potential
for abuse of judicial discretion in sentencing.147 Under the majority
141. United States v. Morrison, 983 F.2d 735, 735 (6th Cir. 1993).
142. Id. at 733-35.
143. United States v. McDonald, 22 F.3d 139, 144 (7th Cir. 1994).
144. See, e.g., Morrison, 983 F.2d at 736 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (noting, hypothetically, that "a murderer caught stealing gum" could receive the acceptance
of responsibility reduction).
145. See id. (noting that a district court might find "the theft of chewing gum in particular
circumstances illuminative of whether the murderer has accepted responsibility for her actions").
146. S. REP. No. 98-225, at 161 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3344.
147. The danger of judicial abuse of discretion in acceptance of responsibility determination
is heightened by the degree of deference afforded to sentencing judges. Application Note 5 of Rule
3E1.1 states that "the determination of the sentencing judge is entitled to great deference on
review." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1, application note 5 (1998).
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view, a criminal convicted in federal court of mail fraud could lose
his reduction under Rule 3E1.1 for any conceivable misdemeanor,
such as speeding, jay-walking, or loitering.148 Yet in the adjacent
courtroom, a criminal convicted of the same crime could earn a re-
duced sentence despite the commission of a more severe subsequent
crime, depending on the sentencing philosophy of the judge. With
its heightened degree of latitude, the majority standard subverts
the fundamental purpose of the Sentencing Guidelines.
The Morrison standard, by contrast, is less prone to such ju-
dicial discretion. By creating a framework in which only related
crimes will trigger a loss in reduction, the Sixth Circuit has less-
ened the disparity in sentences that initially caused Congress to
create the Guidelines.
Critics of the Morrison approach may argue that the deter-
mination of whether a crime is "reasonably related" entails as
much, if not more judicial discretion than the majority approach.
While it is true that the question of whether a crime is "reasonably
related" to the underlying offense may seem discretionary in the
abstract, courts have in fact already developed tests specifically to
use with the Sentencing Guidelines that determine whether a sub-
sequent offense is similar to a previous offense. Rule 4 of the Sen-
tencing Guidelines outlines the procedure for calculating a defen-
dant's criminal history score. 149 The Sentencing Guidelines require
sentencing judges to add points onto a defendant's sentencing score
if he has a record of prior criminal convictions.150 Rule 4A1.2(c),
148. The posture adopted by many of the courts in the majority when determining accep-
tance of responsibility bears a resemblance to the posture adopted by courts in probation revoca-
tion proceedings. See, e.g., United State v. Ceccarani, 98 F.3d 126, 130 (3d Cir. 1996) C'One of
these [bail] conditions obligated the defendant not to commit any offense in violation of federal,
state or local law... [This] was an express condition.., and, when violated, constituted grounds
for revocation of bail." (emphasis added)). Treating a 3E1.1 determination like a parole revoca-
tion proceeding is flawed for one principal reason. In parole revocation, probation officers may
exercise discretion by refusing to report those crimes that are minor or not of a continuing pat-
tern. See UNITED STATES GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7B1.2; see also United States v. McNickles, 948
F. Supp. 345, 349 (D. Del. 1996). Probation officers, therefore, act as a kind of buffer, insuring
that criminal defendants do not necessarily lose their parole because of a trivial criminal act. In
the parole revocation proceedings themselves, courts correctly consider any crime committed by
the defendant, since reported crimes must have filtered through the probation officer, insuring
that only serious criminal activity gets reported. No such buffer exists in a 3E1.1 determination.
It is illogical, therefore, for a court to adopt the posture of a parole revocation proceeding when
making its 3E1.1 determination, since the procedural safeguards are dissimilar.
149. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4.
150. See id. § 4A1.2(c). For example, judges are required to "(a) add 3 points for each prior
sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month... (b) [a]dd 2 points for each prior
sentence of imprisonment of at least sixty days and not counted in (a) ... [and] (c) [a]dd 1 point
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however, allows judges to exclude certain prior offenses from the
criminal history score. 151 The Rule lists several crimes, such as
reckless driving, contempt of court, prostitution, and resisting ar-
rest, the prior violation of which may not be used to contribute to a
defendant's criminal history score. Significantly, the Rule notes
that crimes similar to the listed crimes may also be excluded from
a defendant's criminal history score.
152
In response to uncertainty at the trial court level as to the
meaning of "similar," the majority of circuits have adopted compre-
hensive tests to determine whether one offense is "similar" to an-
other for purposes of sentencing. 58 These tests vary in stringency.
In the "multifactor approach" adopted by the Fifth Circuit, trial
courts must examine "a comparison of punishments imposed for the
listed and unlisted offenses, the perceived seriousness of the offense
... the elements of the offense, the level of culpability involved, and
the degree to which the commission of the offense indicates a likeli-
hood of recurring criminal conduct."154 An alternate approach exclu-
sively focuses on the degree of commonality between the elements
of the two offenses. 155
Regardless of which approach gains ultimate acceptance, the
mere existence of such standards creates a framework in the ma-
jority of circuits from which a trial judge may determine "similar-
ity." Admittedly, these tests are not wholly objective, and trial
judges must still rely on some subjective indicia to determine
for each prior sentence not counted in (a) or (b), up to a total of 4 points for this item." Id. § 4Al.1
(emphasis removed).
151. See id. § 4A1.2(c).
152. "Sentences for all felony offenses are counted. Sentences for misdemeanor and petty of-
fenses are counted, except as follows: (1) Sentences for [the listed prior offenses] and offenses
similar to them, by whatever name they are known, are counted only if (A) the sentence was a
term of probation of at least one year or a term of imprisonment of at least thirty days, or (B) the
prior offense was similar to the instant offense." Id. (emphasis added).
153. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Santos, 184 F.3d 196, 204-05 (2d Cir. 1999) (adopt-
ing a "multifactor" approach); United States v. Sandoval, 152 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 1998)
(applying two different approaches, focusing first on whether both crimes share the same general
characteristics and second on whether the activity underlying the two offenses is similar), cert.
denied, 525 U.S. 1086 (1999); United States v. Boyd, 146 F.3d 499, 501-02 (7th Cir. 1998) (re-
fusing to adopt a specific test but applying a multifactor approach in practice); United States v.
Harris, 128 F.3d 850, 854-55 (4th Cir. 1997) (adopting a more limited approach based on whether
the two crimes have common elements); United States v. Elmore, 108 F.3d 23, 26-27 (3d Cir.
1997) (same); United States v. Unger, 915 P.2d 759, 762-63 (1st Cir. 1990) (same).
154. United States v. Hardeman, 933 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1991).
155. See Harris, 128 F.3d at 854-55 (adopting a strict approach whereby trial courts look to
whether there are common elements between the two crimes).
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whether the two crimes are similar. 156 But adoption of this ap-
proach would succeed in adding another level of predictability to
the sentencing process, while at the same time reducing judicial
discretion. Whereas the majority interpretation of Rule 3E1.1 al-
lows trial judges to rely on almost any criteria'5 7 to determine
whether a subsequent criminal act disallows the reduction, a com-
bination of the Morrison approach and the "similarity tests" used
for Rule 4A1.2(c) would create both a less discretionary and more
predictable test for trial judges.
Use of Rule 4A1.2(c) tests also provides the advantage of fa-
miliarity. Trial judges have invariably used the tests adopted by
their circuits, and are no doubt familiar with their requirements.
VI. CONCLUSION
In spite of.its limited scope, Rule 3E1.1 plays a vital role in
sentence calculation. In 1997, approximately 86 percent of all
criminal cases reported to the Sentencing Commission received a
reduction under Rule 3E1.1.158 Among federal circuit courts, the
third-highest number of appeals comes from disputes over the ap-
plication of Rule 3E1.1. 159 As a result, ambiguities in construction
and disagreements in interpretation take on heightened impor-
tance.
The Morrison approach does much to solve the Rule's ambi-
guity, while also enhancing predictability and uniformity in the
sentencing process. By defining which post-plea criminal activities
can be used in determining acceptance of responsibility, the Morri-
son approach creates a clear standard that sentencing judges can
easily follow. Simply stated, under the Morrison standard, like
criminals are treated alike. Sentences become predictable and uni-
form-two traits sought by the Sentencing Commission. Moreover,
such a standard may actually encourage cooperation, since defen-
dants may be more likely to plead guilty when the parameters of
156. See Hardeman, 933 F.2d at 281 (listing one of the elements of the test as "the degree to
which the commission of the offense indicates a likelihood of recurring criminal conduct").
157. Rule 5H1 of the Sentencing Guidelines prohibits trial judges from considering the fol-
lowing factors in any discretionary sentencing actions: race, creed, religion, socioeconomic status,
disadvantaged upbringing, drug or alcohol dependence, and economic hardship. U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5H1.2-1.12.
158. Of the 41,735 cases reported to the Sentencing Commission in 1997, 36,853 received a
reduction under Rule 3E1.1. UNITED STATES SENTENCING CO0JMISION, 1997 SOURCEBOOK OF
FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 42 (1997).
159. O'Hear, supra note 4, at 1512 n.14.
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the reduction are made clear. Only by creating clear standards in
sentencing can judges conform to the Sentencing Guidelines' goal of
predictability and uniformity.
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